Buying
Title
Summary Test
Test Author and Test Author 2
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January 14, 1985
Intervention | Date Announced | Description |
---|---|---|
Government Deposit Guarantee Metrick-Schmelzing database classification | October 2008 | Italian authorities implemented Law Decree 155 (10/8/2008), which empowered the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to issue a three year guarantee for bank deposits in addition to the existing bank-funded Italian deposit insurance scheme that covered deposits up to approximately EUR 100,000 (Bank of Italy 2008, 21; Cleary Gottlieb 2008). The MEF never formally issued the guarantee (IMF 2013, 17, footnote 15). |
Italian Guarantee Scheme Bank Debt Guarantee | October 2008 | Law Decree 157 (10/13/2008) provided for the MEF to guarantee senior debt issued by solvent banks in an effort to support short and medium term financing needs amidst liquidity pressures (Engbith 2020, 758). The program allowed Italian banks and their foreign subsidiaries to apply for full guarantees on euro- denominated senior debt instruments issued after October 13, 2008, with maturities between three months and five years (Engbith 2020, 758). The eligibility window, initially set at six month, was extended once, and closed on December 31, 2009, with no banks enrolled owing to the high fees associated with the guarantee relative to the sovereign credit status of Italy (Engbith 2020, 758). |
- The Italian economy contracted by 6% in 2008-2009, before partially recovering from 2010-2011. Following the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis, GDP fell by another 5% in 2012-2013. Subsequent growth was slow, and as of the onset of the COVID pandemic GDP remained below 2007 levels (IMF 2024, 18).
- Credit provision by Italian banks fell by 4% in response to the onset of the GFC before beginning to recover in mid-2010. The onset of the sovereign debt crisis caused credit provision to fall by a further 30%, with full recovery not occurring until the first quarter of 2020 (IMF 2024, 18). That said, the decline in lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises was less severe among the four banks that received Tremonti bonds (Hoyos 2021, 237).
- As of 2020, the average capital ratio of Italian banks was below the euro area average (IMF 2020, 7). Italian banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign bonds remained high at over 10.5% of total assets in 2020 (IMF 2020, 16).
- Italian banks’ NPL levels peaked at around 16% in 2015 (IMF 2024, 22). Despite improvement, they remained among the highest in the EU in 2020 (IMF 2020, 7).
- The largest recipient of Tremonti bonds, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), receiving EUR 1.9 billion of the EUR 4.1 billion total, was unable to successfully exit from the program and went on to receive an additional recapitalization in 2013 and a final one in 2017 (Hoffner 2024; IMF 2013, 21).
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ntervention | Date Announced | Description |
---|---|---|
Government Deposit Guarantee Metrick-Schmelzing database classification | October 2008 | Italian authorities implemented Law Decree 155 (10/8/2008), which empowered the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to issue a three year guarantee for bank deposits in addition to the existing bank-funded Italian deposit insurance scheme that covered deposits up to approximately EUR 100,000 (Bank of Italy 2008, 21; Cleary Gottlieb 2008). The MEF never formally issued the guarantee (IMF 2013, 17, footnote 15). |
Italian Guarantee Scheme Bank Debt Guarantee | October 2008 | Law Decree 157 (10/13/2008) provided for the MEF to guarantee senior debt issued by solvent banks in an effort to support short and medium term financing needs amidst liquidity pressures (Engbith 2020, 758). The program allowed Italian banks and their foreign subsidiaries to apply for full guarantees on euro- denominated senior debt instruments issued after October 13, 2008, with maturities between three months and five years (Engbith 2020, 758). The eligibility window, initially set at six month, was extended once, and closed on December 31, 2009, with no banks enrolled owing to the high fees associated with the guarantee relative to the sovereign credit status of Italy (Engbith 2020, 758). |
- In its 2013 Financial System Stability Assessment, the IMF found that the measures announced by Italian authorities in October-November 2008 helped promote depositor confidence and financial stability without entailing significant costs (IMF 2013b, 44).
- A 2024 IMF assessment concluded that during the GFC and subsequent sovereign debt crisis, Italian authorities succeeded in avoiding a widespread banking crisis but endured a “prolonged and costly cleanup” (IMF 2024, 22).
- Italy’s weak sovereign credit status hampered the effectiveness of the Italian Guarantee Scheme for bank debt. Italian authorities set fees consistent with guidance from the ECB, calling for uniform fee structure across the EU. Authorities believed that high fees relative to Italy’s weaker sovereign credit status, in addition to Italian bank’s relatively strong credit profiles, contributed to a lack of interest in participation (Engbith 2020, 763).
- In the Tremonti recapitalization program, there was speculation that the two largest Italian banks, Unicredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, would participate in the program. These banks chose instead to raise private capital, apparently to avoid the program’s ethics demands on lending to SMEs and households. By September 2009, Unicredit and Intesa Sanpaolo posted core Tier 1 capital ratios of 7.5% and 7.2%, respectively (Hoyos 2021, 235–236).
- Italy’s NPL problem was exacerbated by the inability of the judicial system to enforce creditor rights and conduct insolvency proceedings in a timely manner (IMF 2020, 36).
- Timing, Combinations] Italy’s initial liquidity measures helped prevent a banking crisis, but did not include the entire range of interventions necessary to fully address conditions in the banking system, resulting in a cleanup process that was “prolonged and costly.” 18).
- [Preparation] The lack of adequate judicial resources and processes hindered efforts to address the NPL problem in the Italian banking system.
- [Combinations] The failure to address continued high levels of domestic sovereign debt exposure left Italian banks vulnerable to a sovereign shock feedback loop.
(IMF 2020a) International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2020a. “IMF COVID-19 Response—A New Short-Term Liquidity Line to Enhance the Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net,” April 21, 2020.
IMF policy paper summarizing the design details and circumstances around the SLL.
(BCC 2022a) Banco Central de Chile (BCC). 2022a. “Acuerdo adoptado por el consejo del Banco Central de Chile en su sesión ordinaria no 2473e,” May 20, 2022.
The SLL agreement between the IMF and the Banco Central de Chile (in Spanish).
(IMF 2010) International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2010. “The Fund’s Mandate—The Legal Framework,” February 22, 2010.
Overview of the IMF’s legal framework.
In analyzing the interventions that are the focus of this summary, we used a color-coded system to highlight certain particularly noteworthy design features.
Treatment | Meaning |
---|---|
BLUE – INTERESTING | A design feature that is interesting and that policymakers may want to consider. Typically, this determination is based on the observation that the design feature involves a unique and potentially promising way of addressing a common challenge that may not be obvious. Less typically, empirical evidence or a consensus will indicate that the design feature was effective in this context, in which case we will describe that evidence or consensus. |
YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED | A design feature that policymakers should exercise caution in considering. Typically, this determination is based on the observation that the designers of the feature later made significant changes to the feature with the intention of improving outcomes. Less typically, empirical evidence or a consensus will indicate that the design feature was ineffective in this context, in which case we will describe that evidence or consensus. |
FOOTNOTE IN ITALICS | Where the reason that a given design feature has been highlighted is not apparent from the text, it is accompanied by an italicized footnote that explains why we chose to highlight it. Where necessary, these footnotes will be used to identify any considerations that should be kept in mind when thinking about the feature. |
This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth considering or (2) require caution.
Categories
Intervention Categories:
- Buying,
- Reserve Requirements
Institutions:
- AIG,
- Banca Marche
Countries and Regions:
- Luxembourg,
- Australia
Crises:
- Czech Currency Crisis,
- Ecaudorian Banking Crisis 1990s
Issues:
- Moral Hazard